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Abstract    
 
The current emphasis in the microfinance industry is a shift from donor-funded to 
commercially sustainable operations. This article evaluates the impact of access to 
microloans from the Khushhali Bank – Pakistan‟s first and largest microfinance bank 
which operates on commercial principles. Using primary data from a detailed 
household survey of nearly 3000 borrower and non-borrower households, a 
difference in difference approach is used to test for the impact of access to loans. 
Once the results are disaggregated between rural and urban areas there is a positive 
impact in rural areas on food expenditure and on some social indicators. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Asia, Pakistan, Microfinance, Poverty, Impact, Empowerment, Millennium 
Development Goals. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) reflect ambitious development targets 
encompassing not only monetary measures of poverty, but also more comprehensive 
measures of development that quantify development in areas such as education, 
gender equality and health.1 By providing small scale financial services to those on 
low incomes, microfinance is seen by many as one of the most significant of the 
instruments to support these targets. Representing this hope, the United Nations 
declared 2005 the International Year of Microcredit with the goal of “Building 
Inclusive Financial Sectors to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals” 
(International Year of Microcredit, n.d.).  
 
None the less, within the microfinance industry it is recognized that microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) that rely on aid funding will be subject to the vagaries of aid 
budgets and will never to able to expand to the scale that will make a major change 
in poverty and related social indicators at a national level. The response has been to 
shift the focus of MFI activity from donor-driven schemes that channel subsidized 
credit to borrowers to commercially-oriented operations charging interest rates that 
cover full costs and are thus financially self-reliant. This „commercialization of 
microfinance‟ has prompted considerable debate as to how far it is compatible with 
the original poverty reduction mission of MFIs (Montgomery and Weiss, 2005). One 
commentator has gone so far as to refer to „a battle for the soul of microfinance‟ 
(Harford, 2008). This question cannot be answered a-priori and empirical evidence is 
needed to clarify the extent to which there is indeed a trade-off between financial 
sustainability and achievement of the MDGs and related poverty targets. The trade- 
off can be examined in various ways. For example, one approach assesses the 
impact on borrowers of interest rate increases that accompany the shift to a 
commercially oriented microfinance sector (Dehejia et al, 2008 and Karlan and 
Zinman, 2008). Another examines a large sample of MFIs covering a variety of 
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institutional forms and lending methodologies to see how far any dilution of poverty 
focus (as proxied by loan size) can be associated with the MFI‟s lending 
methodology, size or age. The authors conclude that for larger and older MFIs the 
results are consistent with the view that „as institutions mature and grow they focus 
increasingly on clients that can absorb larger loans.‟ (Cull et al, 2007 : 131?). This is 
not necessarily „mission drift‟ since more poor borrowers could still be served under a 
commercial model, but it is a warning that even NGO MFIs may not be focusing 
primarily on the very poor any more.  Conducting detailed and rigorous impact 
studies is difficult and as one review paper has commented „thirty years into the 
microfinance movement we have little solid evidence that it improves the lives of 
clients in a measurable way‟ (Roodman and Murdoch 2009: 3-4). 
 
This paper contributes to this debate by focusing on a case-study of a relatively new 
commercially-oriented microfinance bank. It reports the analysis of survey data 
collected in Pakistan in 2005 relating to the lending activity of the Khushhali Bank, 
the first licensed microfinance bank in the country and one designed to operate on 
commercial lines but with a social mission consistent with the MDGs, which in turn 
form the center-piece of the government‟s poverty reduction strategy (Government of 
Pakistan 2003). The paper is distinct in a number of ways: it is based on a large 
national survey of 2881 households, which is a far larger sample than is normal for 
this type of study; it focuses on a country in which the microfinance sector is 
relatively new and where little rigorous work has been conducted on the impact of 
microfinance; it applies a rigorous control group approach that addresses the main 
sources of bias; and it uses a wide range of outcome measures to capture the impact 
of lending on alternative dimensions of welfare.  
 
II. Khushhali Bank Operations  
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Microfinance remains relatively little developed in Pakistan, although there has been 
rapid growth since 2000 starting from a low base. As of March 2008 there were 
estimated to be around 1.6 million active borrowers with an average loan size of Rs 
11,000 (less than $150) as compared with Rs 460,000 in the banking sector as a 
whole. However, the potential market for microcredit is likely to be much larger than 
this and the microfinance strategy of the State Bank of Pakistan targeted a total of 3 
million borrowers by 2010.2 
 
 The Khushhali bank was founded in 2000 as the first initiative of the Microfinance 
Development Program sponsored by the Asian Development Bank. It was an early 
version of a commercially-oriented microfinance intervention with its share capital 
drawn from 16 commercial banks. Whilst  operating alongside more conventional aid 
funded MFIs, it has become the largest provider of microfinance in Pakistan, now 
providing a range of loan products to over 360,000 active borrowers (nearly 25% of 
the national total), whilst focusing on the core objective of operational self-sufficiency. 
It is not a perfect case-study of a commercially oriented microfinance bank since 
although its objectives are commercial it has not yet achieved full financial self-
sufficiency.  Even though its Annual Report for 2007 reports a profit before tax of 
Rs156 million and a return on equity of 5%, these calculations do not net out the 
effect of the substantial interest rate subsidy from the Asian Development Bank and 
independent estimates suggest that the operational self-sufficiency ratio is no more 
than 80%.3 The most recent Annual Report for 2008 reports a profit after tax of Rs 
103 million but again this fails to remove the effect of any financial subsidy. Hence 
what we are examining is the impact of the lending of a bank that is aiming for 
financial viability but which is not yet operating on fully commercial lines. 
 
As part of its social mission Khushhali targets clients who are “poor” and “very poor”, 
but not those who are “destitute” (living off charity, or zakat) or the “non-poor”, who 
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receive enough income to pay income tax. In the sample drawn for this study in 
2005, more than 70% of the clients were below the official poverty line of the 
Government of Pakistan and 20% were at less than half of the caloric consumption of 
those defined as poor.4 When data for this study was collected in 2005, the bulk of 
clients (60%) were in rural areas and roughly one-third were women, although 
according to the bank‟s more recent Annual Reports both of those ratios have 
declined as the bank has expanded in the past few years.    
 
At the time of the survey the bank offered eligible clients uncollateralized micro-loans 
of Rs3,000 – Rs 30,000.5 The first loan would be between Rs 3,000-10,000 and loan 
sizes increase 20% with each cycle to a maximum of Rs 30,000.  The terms of the 
microloan vary between 3-12 months, to be repaid with interest on declining balances 
in equal monthly installments or in one bullet payment, depending on the purpose of 
the loan. Loans were offered for investments in arable agriculture, in livestock or in 
micro-enterprises to establish a new business or to purchase assets or working 
capital for an existing business, but not for consumption. At the time of the survey in 
2005 the interest rate was 20% and the average loan per borrower was $142. This 
was higher than that charged by other microfinance institutions and well above the 
average lending rate of 11% reported in the IMF International Financial Statistics, 
however it is well below earlier estimates of the cost of borrowing from informal credit 
sources (Arif 1999).   
 
Although the bank has introduced an individual scoring report to screen and classify 
clients according to the above eligibility criteria, it uses a group lending methodology 
under which clients form groups called community organizations that can be male, 
female or mixed gender groups of between 3 to 25 members (usually 3-5 members in 
urban areas and 10-25 in rural) who provide personal guarantees to each other.  
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Loans are made directly to individuals in the group, but if any one member of the 
group defaults then all members of that group become ineligible for loans.   
 
 
III. Research Methodology 
 
The first question to be addressed in conducting any impact evaluation is: how to 
measure impact? Most microfinance programs are designed to encourage borrowers 
to invest their loans in their farms or microenterprises. The hope is that these 
investments will lead to higher profits, which will in turn lead to higher household 
income, which will gradually lift client households out of poverty.  Microfinance may 
also affect non-income measures of household welfare such as health, education or 
empowerment. Note that the effects of microfinance on these broader measures of 
welfare may not be expected to be all positive. On the one-hand, households with 
more profitable family farms or microenterprises may be able to afford textbooks for 
their school age children, or hire workers to help with duties previously required of 
family members.  On the other hand, the extra time required of household members 
in running a newly-profitable family farm or microenterprise may also lead to lower 
enrollment rates for school age children who are encouraged to skip school or drop 
out all-together in order to contribute to the business.   
 
In this study, we used the Khushhali Bank mandate of   
 
“…providing micro-finance services to poor persons, particularly poor 
women for mitigating poverty and promoting social welfare and 
economic justice through community building and social mobilization 
with the ultimate objective of poverty alleviation.” (Status and Nature 
of Business, from Khushhali Bank Annual Report 2004)  
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as a guide in designing our study. Thus, we looked at what might be called 
traditional, or at least, direct, impacts of microfinance on household business profits 
as well as broader measures of household welfare such as health, education, female 
empowerment and finally, poverty, as measured by food and non-food consumption-
expenditure.  
 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the measures of household welfare used in 
this study. Business profits for the different types of activities supported by Khushhali 
Bank loans – agriculture and livestock farming as well as microenterprise - are 
measured by reported profits and sales. Consumption-expenditure, the basis for 
measuring official poverty statistics in Pakistan, measured as food expenditures, non-
food expenditures, medical expenditures and educational expenditures per child, 
indicates income effects of participation in the microfinance program. Non-income 
measures of household welfare are also included: the probability that children are in 
school, absenteeism from school, the probability of seeking medical treatment if ill 
and the quality of that treatment (as measured by the degree of training of the 
provider). Given the mandate to serve women particularly, we also looked at the 
impacts of participation in the microfinance program on the empowerment of women, 
as measured by the extent to which female respondents in each household felt their 
opinions were taken into account in household decisions on things such as the 
children‟s upbringing (their schooling and marriage), financial matters (whether or not 
to borrow money, sell or purchase livestock, repair the home) and the female 
household member‟s decision to work outside the home or participate in community 
political activities.   
 
Once the indicator of interest has been identified, a perfect impact evaluation needs 
to answer a counterfactual question: how does the status of participants in the 
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program as measured by those variables compare with how those same individuals 
would have fared in the absence of the program? The problem with cross-sections of 
data (observations on many individuals at a given point in time) is that at any given 
point in time, individuals are observed to be either participants or not. Even panels of 
data (observations on many individuals through time) are problematic since over time 
many other things have happened to the individuals in addition to program 
participation and it is nearly impossible to separate out the impact of the program 
from all the other influences. In practice, researchers must settle for estimates of the 
average impact of the program on a group of participants – the treatment group – 
compared to a credible comparison group – a control group. The ideal control group 
is individuals who would have had outcomes similar to those in the treatment group if 
the members of the treatment group had not participated in the program.  
 
Constructing a control group comparable to the treatment group is not 
straightforward. Participants in the program are usually different from non-
participants in many ways: programs may be carefully placed in specific areas, 
participants within those areas may be screened for participation, and the final 
decision on whether or not to participate is usually voluntary. To the extent that these 
factors are known and can be measured, they can be controlled for in the empirical 
analysis, but in most cases the placement of the program and self-selection of 
participants in those areas into the program are based on unobservable factors. 
These unobservable factors lead to at least two kinds of bias in any empirical impact 
evaluation: program placement bias and self-selection bias. 
 
Controlling for this bias – determining the effects of microfinance alone and 
separating out the impact of microcredit from what would have happened to the same 
household without credit – is often the most difficult part of empirical impact studies. 
Well-run microfinance institutions do not randomize either the location of their 
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operations or their selection of clients. If MFIs tend to operate in areas that have 
relatively better or worse infrastructure such as access by roads or more or less 
active markets, then estimates of the impacts of the program on participants do not 
measure the effects just of microfinance, but of these other factors as well. Even 
within a given village, if, as studies by Hashemi (1997), Alexander (2001) and 
Coleman (2006) suggest, microfinance clients already have initial advantages over 
non-clients, then the impact of microfinance will be overestimated if these initial 
biases are not controlled for. Similarly, the impact of microfinance programs that 
deliberately target relatively disadvantaged households in the areas they operate 
may be underestimated if these biases are not controlled for.6  
 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) provide a compelling argument in favor 
of making the substantial investment required to conduct careful impact studies that 
control for these potential biases: 
 
Unfortunately, this is not an esoteric concern that practitioners and 
policymakers can safely ignore. It is not just a difference between 
obtaining “very good” estimates of impacts versus “perfect” estimates 
– the biases can be large. In evaluating the Grameen Bank, for 
example, Signe-Mary McKernan (2002) finds that not controlling for 
selection bias can lead to overestimation of the effect of participation 
on profits by as much as 100 percent. In other cases …controlling for 
these biases reverses conclusions about impacts entirely. 
 
There are three broad approaches that have been applied elsewhere in the 
microfinance literature. One is the use of a randomized study design to control for 
selection bias (Duflo and Kremer, 2005, World Bank, 2008, McKenzie, 2009). This 
approach eliminates selection bias by randomly selecting treatment (those who 
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receive microfinance) and control (those who do not) groups from a potential 
population of participants. With this type of study design, the researcher can be 
assured that on average those who are exposed to the program are no different than 
those who are not and thus that a statistically significant difference between the 
groups‟ outcomes can be confidently attributed to the program rather than to 
selection bias.  
 
This randomized approach follows that adopted in clinical drugs trials and is seen by 
many as the best way of rigorously proving impact. A few studies applying this 
approach have been conducted or are ongoing. For example, Banerjee et al (2009) 
apply the approach to the expansion of MFIs in slum areas in Hyderabad, India, 
finding that in the short-term access to microcredit helps business start-up and to 
fund investment. However, it appears to have no impact on social indicators relating 
to female empowerment or family health or education. The qualification is that these 
are short-term effects and through higher investment future monetary and non-
monetary benefits may arise. The authors conclude that microfinance can be a useful 
means of helping the entrepreneurial poor, but it is not a miracle in the sense of 
transforming social conditions.  Interestingly, some initial results from randomized 
work question key tenets of the microfinance literature. For example, a study on Sri 
Lanka finds far higher returns to male-headed as opposed to female-headed micro-
enterprises (de Mel et al., 2008).  
 
Well-designed randomized studies of this sort have the potential to rigorously 
address all kinds of potential biases, but their overall “acknowledged weakness is 
external validity – the ability to learn from an evaluation about how the specific 
intervention will work in other settings and at larger scales.” (Ravallion, 2009: 3) One 
limitation of small-scale randomized social experiments is that they can only estimate 
partial equilibrium treatment effects, which may differ from general equilibrium 
 13 
treatment effects. In the case of microfinance, this means that if, for example, 
microfinance is introduced on a large scale, the functioning of financial markets may 
eventually be affected, thus yielding a different impact than the necessarily smaller-
scale program introduced for the impact study. There is also the potential for 
spillovers that create external benefits, for example from treated villages or areas 
where microfinance operates to untreated ones it has yet to reach. There is thus the 
possibility that non-program participants may benefit indirectly from the gains of 
participants which will distort the impact assessment. The biggest problem for 
external validity of randomized studies is related to the issue of unobservable 
characteristics that affect both program placement and self-selection. A randomized 
study will include in the treatment group individuals with and without these 
unobservable characteristics to get a truly unbiased measure of impact. But when 
interventions such as microfinance are introduced on a large scale, the participants  
tend to have those characteristics. Thus, despite their scientific appeal, randomized 
studies are not always the most relevant for policy makers. (Ravallion, 2009 :.2). 
 
Another, more practical, concern in attempting to apply randomized study design is 
that such studies require tremendous cooperation from the institutions being 
evaluated, which must be willing to allow researchers to randomize the 
implementation of their services. Such studies are preferably longitudinal, making 
them costly, and it can be difficult to conduct research over a period long enough for 
some impacts to show up. Intellectual arguments aside, for these practical reasons 
the randomization approach was not applied in this study. 
 
A simpler alternative is to identify a control group through some identifiable eligibility 
attribute. A well known study by Pitt and Khandker (1998) used land ownership. The 
authors sample participants and non-participants of microfinance programs in a 
number of treatment villages where group lending programs are operating as well as 
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randomly selected households from control villages without a program. They use 
village fixed effects to correct for the endogeneity of program placement and take 
advantage of the fact that the microcredit programs impose eligibility requirements on 
participants (households with land holdings of more than half an acre are ineligible) 
to determine eligible and ineligible households in the control villages. Impact is 
assessed using a difference-in-difference approach between eligible and ineligible 
households and between program and non-program villages. After controlling for 
other factors, such as various household characteristics, any remaining difference is 
attributed to the microfinance programs. The difficulty with this approach is that clear 
eligibility criteria for access to microfinance need to be identifiable and strictly 
applied.7  
 
Another approach to controlling for self-selection and placement bias is to include a 
sample of microcredit clients who have formed solidarity groups but have not yet 
received loans as the control group (Hulme and Mosley, 1996, Coleman, 1999 and 
2006). In this approach, participating and non-participating households are again 
surveyed in treatment villages where the microcredit program is already operating 
and has already given loans. The controls are villages where the microcredit program 
will operate and households from the village which have already self-selected to 
participate in the program but have not yet actually received loans. 
 
Hulme and Mosley (1996) employed this approach in their major study of programs in 
a number of countries. However, arguably their study fails to control for the major 
source of bias – program placement bias – so part of the advantage of program 
participants relative to the control group may be due to unmeasured village attributes 
that affect both the supply and demand for credit. Using the same basic approach, 
Coleman (1999), addressed the placement bias issue by introducing observable 
village characteristics and village dummies in his study of a village banking program 
 15 
in Thailand. Utilizing data on 455 households, including participating and non-
participating households in treatment villages where a village bank is already offering 
microcredit, and selected future participants and non-participants in control villages 
that have been identified to receive a village bank program but have not yet actually 
received funds, Coleman (1999) uses a difference-in-difference approach that 
compares the difference between income for participants and non-participants in 
program villages with the same difference in the control villages, where the programs 
were introduced later. The rationale is that the unobservable characteristics of bank 
members (such as entrepreneurial drive) will be shared by members who have taken 
out a loan and those who have applied but not yet received their loan. Then if other 
measurable household and village characteristics can be controlled for the remaining 
difference can be attributed to the receipt of the microcredit. Chowdhury et al (2005) 
used a similar approach in an analysis of Bangladesh. 
 
The nature of the Khushhali Bank‟s operations lent itself to an impact assessment 
using the latter approach, of taking clients who had not yet accessed loans as the 
control group.  In 2005 the bank was expanding rapidly into new villages and the 
number of active clients was increasing at a rate of approximately 20,000 clients 
every 3 months. These were mostly rural areas of Pakistan in which there were 
previously no formal financial services provided. Bank management and staff were 
willing to cooperate with surveyors in identifying new villages that had just received 
the service and within those villages identifying new clients, allowing them to be 
surveyed in the interim between their application and the approval to get a microloan 
and the actual disbursement of the money.  
 
Concerns about this approach to impact study design center around program 
placement, selection, wealth effects and attrition bias. Each of these is addressed in 
our study design. From discussions with bank management, the sequence in which 
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the bank moved into villages did not appear to be driven systematically by an 
economic rationale, so that there is no deliberate attempt to provide services first to 
villages with an advantageous (or disadvantageous) location due either to climate, 
geography or infrastructure links. Hence “placement bias” did not appear to be a 
factor. However, as a check, village dummies are included in the regression models 
to account for unobserved village effects8.  Selection criteria of the bank was under 
review, but no changes had been implemented at the time of the survey and since 
the control group of members who had not yet borrowed was drawn from villages just 
receiving the service, there is no reason to think that the self-selection criteria on the 
part of clients changed systematically over time, either. Thus, we have no reason to 
think the latent characteristics of our control group of borrowers are fundamentally 
different from those of the treatment group. However, significant for the external 
validity of this study, we do admit that these unobservable characteristics in both the 
treatment and control group of bank members may differ from the non-member 
population at large. There was only a short time period - typically just a few weeks - 
between loan approval and disbursement and the survey was carried out during that 
brief interval. Thus, while we recognize that a wealth effect – the fact that notification 
of approval for a loan may lead to increased household consumption even before 
actual receipt of the loan - may bias downward any impact findings using this 
approach, the short time period in question should limit this effect. Also, overall, there 
is no significant relationship between bank membership and aggregate expenditure, 
which also suggests that a wealth effect may not present any serious problems in 
interpreting the results. Attrition bias – the fact that the control group of approved 
future borrowers includes potential future dropouts or graduates of the program, 
whereas the treatment group of older borrowers, who have remained active, may not 
(Karlan, 2001)9 - can be ruled out here since the sample of clients analyzed here is 
unusual in that it included clients from not only active groups, but also from groups 
that were in default, currently inactive for other reasons, or had completely dropped-
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out of the program.10 Hence, whilst the control group of future borrowers contains 
potential drop-outs and defaulters, so does the treatment group, eliminating attrition 
bias.  
 
In summary, at the time of survey the Khushhali Bank was expanding rapidly into 
new areas with many new members who had self-selected to join the Bank, but not 
yet taken out a loan. These circumstances provided a natural experiment in the form 
of a control group for whom outcomes could be compared with members who had 
already taken out and spent a Khushhali loan. Whilst the approach involves some 
implicit assumptions, for example on the absence of a wealth effect and on the 
unchanging nature of the unobservable characteristics of the treatment and control 
groups, the short time periods involved lessen their significance, thus allowing a 
relatively simple and practical means of assessing impact. 
 
 
 
 
IV. Data and Regression Framework 
 
To conduct the empirical analysis, primary data was collected from 2,881 households 
– more than any other rigorous impact study on microfinance to date.  A stratified 
random sample of 1,454 Khushhali Bank clients and future clients was drawn from 
139 rural villages and 3 urban cities where the bank operates. A roughly equal 
number (1,427) of randomly selected non-clients from the same villages or 
settlements were also surveyed. The survey covered 11 districts across all provinces 
in Pakistan, including Kashmir.   
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At the time the sample was drawn, the bank was operating in approximately 42 
districts in Pakistan and had about 175,000 active clients, 37,000 of which were in 
the 11 districts finally sampled.  Thus, the sample represented more than a quarter of 
the districts served by the bank and about 4% of the clients in the selected districts, 
but less than 1% of the total number of clients at that time.  Roughly 40% of the 
sample of client households were female clients, meaning that the female in the 
household  was the Khushhali Bank program member. This slightly over-represents 
female clients in the sample since at the time of the survey roughly 30% of Khushhali 
clients were women. But the advantage to this slight oversampling is that it may yield 
more robust estimates of gender issues – an important policy question for poverty 
reduction in Pakistan - in the empirical analysis.   
 
One quarter (732, or 25%) of the total sample, were from urban areas.  At the time of 
sampling, roughly 35% of the surveyed areas and approximately 15% of the total 
population of clients at that time were from urban areas.  Loans for micro-enterprises 
were roughly one-third of the total, with the remainder divided between livestock 
rearing and arable farming, with some overlap between these two categories. In each 
household, both the male and female head of household were interviewed separately 
(regardless of the gender of the borrower). Thus, data collection involved nearly 
6,000 individual surveys. As stated above, client households surveyed, both 
borrowers and those who had not yet borrowed, were predominantly poor: 70% were 
living below the poverty line. Average household consumption expenditure per capita 
in the sample (including expenditure on food, consumer durables, heating, rent, 
transport, health and education) was less than $40 per month in nominal terms (see 
Table 1) and average years of education for the most well educated household 
member was less than six years for males and less than two and a half years for 
females (see Table 2). The Appendix gives more details on survey design and 
implementation.  
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Insert Table 1 
 
Insert table 2 
 
As described above, the methodology involves a form of difference-in-difference 
analysis comparing members of the bank and non-members and, within the group of 
members, borrowers and non-borrowers. Two sets of villages are compared – those 
where the Khushalli bank has already been in operation and those where it has 
decided to operate but not yet commenced lending. Within these villages two sets of 
households are compared, those who are not members of the bank and those who 
are. Members in the “old” villages where the bank is already in operation will have 
taken out loans (and hence are borrowers), whilst members in the “new” villages, 
where bank operations have not yet commenced will have been approved for a loan, 
but not yet received it (hence they are members but still non-borrowers). Members 
are assumed to share unobservable characteristics that will influence outcomes in 
the absence of microcredit. However, by separating those members who have 
received a loan from those who have not, and controlling for household 
characteristics (like age, education, literacy, family size and so forth) and village fixed 
effects, the impact of microcredit alone on various outcome indicators can be 
isolated. 
 
Following this approach, the control group for existing borrowers is members in new 
villages, who have not yet actually received their loan, but who are taken to share the 
unobservable characteristics of current borrowers. Impact is estimated with a single 
equation: 
 
ijijijijjijij TMMVXY   4321                                                            (1) 
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where Yij, is a vector of impact or outcome variables, Xij is a vector of household 
characteristics, Vj represents village fixed effects, which control for observable and 
unobservable variables that may influence program placement, Mij is a membership 
dummy variable equal to 1 for any household that is a member of the bank and thus 
able to borrow under the program and Tij is a dummy variable for treatment, which 
reflects bank members who have already received a loan.   
 
Thus, Tij takes a value of 1 for borrower households, who have already taken out a 
loan, either currently or in the past. This excludes the control group of new bank 
members who have applied for and been approved to receive a loan, but have not 
yet received the funds (for those households Tij is zero). The “treatment” group of 
bank member households who have already participated in the program would have 
received their loan sometime between one and five years ago. The most recent 
entrants to the treatment group would have received their loans one year from the 
survey date and successful clients would therefore have fully repaid the loan. The 
oldest borrowers in the treatment group would have received their first loan as long 
as five years before the survey date, when the bank opened its first branches.  Tij 
does not capture the degree of borrowing, so clients who borrowed the smallest loan 
size only once (and perhaps dropped out after that) are included in the treatment 
group in the same way as clients who joined the program five years earlier and who 
took and successfully repaid several loan cycles. This aggregation of borrowers does 
not inform us of the incremental impacts of borrowing – how much more impact 
comes from another loan cycle or a larger loan – but since unobservable factors that 
influence the degree of a client‟s participation are also likely to influence the outcome 
variables of interest, measuring treatment with simple participation rather than the 
degree of participation provides the preferred estimate of impact purely from the 
micro-lending.. 
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The hypothesis tested is whether access to the microfinance program of the 
Khushhali Bank has a positive effect on the various outcome measures of welfare 
described above.  Support for the hypothesis requires that the estimated coefficient 
4 on the interaction term M*T in equation (1) is statistically significant (and, in most 
cases, positive).  
 
In terms of outcome variables under vector Y our concern is to test for the 
contribution of microfinance to a broad set of indicators that roughly correspond to 
the millennium development goals of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (MDG 
1), achieving universal primary education (MDG 2), promoting gender equality and 
empowering women (MDG 3) and reducing child mortality (MDG 4).  This broad 
agenda also corresponds to the goals set by the government of Pakistan for the 
bank. To this end we test for the program‟s impact on income variables, 
consumption-expenditure variables, education variables, variables reflecting aspects 
of gender empowerment and health – especially child health -  variables .  
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the dependent variables in vector Y.  Income 
variables measured include the sales and profits reported for the household‟s income 
generating activities: microenterprise, livestock raising or other agricultural activities. 
The consumption-expenditure variables include food consumption, which is the basis 
for calculating the official poverty line in Pakistan, and thus perhaps the most direct 
indicator of the program‟s impact on poverty. Note that the poverty measure is thus 
an objective indicator. The survey did not attempt to ascertain subjective or 
perception measures of poverty from respondents. Educational objectives were 
measured by the probability of school age children being enrolled in school and 
absenteeism from school. Including measures of gender empowerment is unusual in 
a quantitative study of this type. The measures are derived from yes/no answers to 
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questions on whether the woman‟s opinion is taken into account in a series of 
household decisions ranging from children‟s schooling, their work outside the home, 
use of contraception to the economic activity of the family. Health impacts are 
measured by the probability of household members – adults and children - receiving 
treatment for illnesses and the quality of the treatment, as measured by the training 
of the provider. The survey also collected information on whether children in the 
household were vaccinated and received treatment (ORS) for diarrheal disease, 
which kills more than 50,000 children under the age of five in Pakistan each year 
(UNICEF-WHO, 2009 :15).   
 
Table 2 sets out the summary statistics on the set of household characteristics used 
under vector X in equation (1).   
 
For most of the empirical analysis, ordinary least squares analysis (OLS) was 
applied.  Regressions in which the outcome variable of interest was a yes/no dummy 
variable on qualitative information, logit estimation techniques were used. In addition 
to the aggregate results on the entire sample, heterogeneity is explored by splitting 
the sample into urban and rural households and exploring differential effects on 
households in which the borrower was the male or female head of household. Given 
the potential for the very poor or core poor to be left behind by microfinance, 
particularly where, as in this case, commercial interest rates are charged, we also 
test for whether the relationship between access to funds and the various outcome 
indicators differs for borrowers in the bottom quintile as compared with the sample 
average. 
 
V.  Results 
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Monetary indicators 
 
The first millennium development goal is to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 
with some of the specific targets being to reduce the proportion of the population 
living on less than $1 a day and increasing the proportion of own-account and 
contributing family workers in total employment. The immediate objective of most 
micro-lending -  to provide a source of financial intermediation for micro-enterprise 
and small farmers – is perhaps most directly related to these targets. Thus, we begin 
our discussion with the program‟s impact on monetary indicators of welfare.  
 
Table 3a reports the impact of program participation on sales or profits of the income 
generating activity run by the household – livestock/animal raising, arable agricultural 
activities or micro-enterprise. For the full sample the impact of borrowing under the 
program is not evident in either sales or profits from livestock/animal raising activities 
or for arable farming. At the time the sample was drawn, around two-thirds of loans 
were for this type of activity. Neither is it evident for the sales or profits of 
microenterprises. Additional variables on number of loan cycles, size of loans and 
number of months since taking a loan – not reported here - are also insignificant in 
most cases. This result suggests no income effect from taking out loans.  
 
 Insert Table 3a 
 
Insert Table 3b 
 
Insert Table 3c 
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In addition to the analysis of income effects above, the impact on expenditure of 
drawing on Khushhali bank loans is also examined. The results for four separate 
expenditure variables are reported in table 4a. The first outcome variable, monthly 
consumption per capita, looks at the impact of the program on caloric consumption 
as measured by consumption-expenditure on food items. The items used in 
calculating this variable correspond as closely as possible to the items used by the 
government of Pakistan in calculating the official poverty line. Separately, three other 
expenditure outcome variables are used; monthly per capita consumption of non-
food items (heating, household durables, clothing, transport and so forth), monthly 
per capita expenditure on health care and annual educational expenditure per child in 
the household.  
  
 Insert Table 4a 
 
Insert Table 4b 
 
Insert table 4c 
 
In general, there is no evidence of a quantitatively significant impact of program 
participation on poverty as indicated by consumption-expenditure. There is no 
statistically significant relationship between program participation (M*T, or 
“treatment”, in equation 1) and aggregate consumption expenditure on either food or 
non-food expenditures. Participation in the program also has no statistically 
significant influence on household educational expenditures per child. Not 
surprisingly, educational expenditures per child are determined principally by the 
education level of the highest-educated male and female in the household.  
Nonetheless in one specific area there is evidence that borrowing under the program 
has had an impact on expenditure. Table 4a reports a positive impact on health 
 25 
expenditures, as indicated by the statistically significant positive coefficient estimate 
in column 3.  Relative to the control group households borrowing under the program 
tend to have on average Rs 41 per month higher per capita expenditures on health 
care. Although this is small in absolute terms, since the bank‟s program does nothing 
explicit to encourage health awareness per se (and loans are supposed to be used 
for investment purposes), this suggests that poor households either prefer to or need 
to use any extra income generated by micro-credit on health care rather than on 
education or food consumption.  
 
These results indicate a clear lack of impact of borrowing on income and most 
aspects of expenditure. The survey distinguishes between households (in both 
treatment and control groups) in rural and urban locations (on the basis of the 
location of the Khushhali bank offices) with about one quarter of borrowers from 
urban areas and the remainder from rural. Since borrowers may face different 
constraints and use the loans in different ways in rural and urban settings, the 
analysis sub-divides the sample into urban and rural households. Tables 3b and 3c 
report the urban and rural results respectively for income generating activities and 
tables 4b and 4c do the same for expenditure. In the analysis of sales and 
profits,there is very little change with the exception that there is statistically weak (at 
the 10% level) positive effect of taking out a loan on the sales of urban micro-
enterprises (table 3b column 4). On the expenditure side, however, there is one 
significant notable effect, which is that in rural areas, taking out a loan is positively 
associated with higher food expenditure (table 4c, column 1). In contrast, the positive 
impact on household health expenditure found in the full sample does not show up in 
the analysis of the rural and urban sub-samples. 
 
These results are disappointing for those seeking evidence of a positive impact of 
lending by the Khushhali bank on household income. There is little evidence of a 
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direct impact on income generation, the main intention of the bank. Considering 
broader monetary indicators, positive impacts are found for health and food 
expenditures, although the former result is not robust and the latter applies only to 
rural areas. These results may trouble purists who hold that microfinance should be  
granted for investment purposes only, not for consumption smoothing to meet short-
term household expenditures on food and health. A more flexible view of the role of 
microfinance would allow these expenditures to be considered as part of household 
financial planning where fungible resources are allocated in line with household 
needs.  
 
Social Indicators 
 
Expenditure-based poverty measures can omit important non-monetary dimensions 
of welfare, as reflected in the millennium development goals to achieve universal 
primary education, empower women and reduce child mortality. Tables 5 and 6 look 
at the impact of microcredit on non-monetary social indicators relating to education, 
health and female empowerment.  
 
Turning first to table 5, there is little evidence of a positive impact of the program 
overall on education, Although children in Khushhali Bank member households are 
more likely to be enrolled in school than children in non-member households, 
children in households already participating by taking out loans are no more likely to 
be enrolled in school and have the same rates of absenteeism as children in 
households that are members of the bank but have not yet taken out loans.   
 
 Insert Table 5 
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For health indicators, however, in line with the expenditure results there is evidence 
that households already participating in the program are more likely to get medical 
treatment for their children‟s illnesses, and that the treatment is more likely to come 
from a trained medical professional, as compared with non-borrowing members (see 
table 5 columns 6 and 7). The odds ratios from the logit regressions suggest that 
borrowing households are about one and a half times more likely to seek medical 
treatment when their children are ill. Of those households who seek treatment for 
their children‟s illnesses, participating households are one and a half times more 
likely than a not yet borrowing household to turn to a trained medical professional for 
that treatment.   
 
As with the analysis of the monetary indicators, the sample is further divided by 
urban and rural households. The positive impact of the program on health indicators 
seems to be primarily enjoyed by rural households. For urban households no 
significant results are obtained for the key education and health indicators, whilst for 
rural households the results from the general sample on the greater probability of 
seeking medical treatment for children and on the use of a trained health professional 
associated with taking out a loan are confirmed.11  
 
Female empowerment 
 
An important aspect of the study design is to test whether borrowing under the 
program has an impact on female empowerment, as gauged through responses to 
questions on female involvement in family decision-making, political activity and work 
outside the home. The survey asks married females between the ages of 15-40 to 
grade answers to questions on their involvement in the various family decisions on a 
scale of 1 to 6 ranging from „always‟ to „never‟ and answers are grouped into yes/no 
categories to allow the application of logit analysis. In analyzing female 
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empowerment, we explore heterogeneity in the sample across households in which 
the bank member and borrower was male or female. These results are reported in 
table 6. 
 
 Insert Table 6 
 
Table 6 confirms that, as expected, female Khushhali bank members are already 
more empowered than non-members, as evidenced by the highly significant positive 
parameter estimates on the coefficient estimates on a “Female Khushhali Bank 
client” dummy in specifications looking at the role of females in decisions on number 
of children, repair of property and borrowing money. However, unexpectedly, wives 
of male bank members tend to be less empowered than women in non-member 
households in a few areas – the decision on number of children and on property 
repair - as evidenced by the significant negative coefficient on the variable “Khushhali 
Bank client”. After member households actually receive a loan, the wives of male 
bank clients report being more empowered in several areas (see the significantly 
positive coefficients on the variable “Accessed Loans”), and these positive effects 
outweigh the negative bias that apparently exists in member households. Thus 
overall, accessing a loan does appear to make a difference to the sense of 
empowerment: the negative coefficients on Khushhali Bank client in table 6 columns 
3 and 4 are smaller and less significantly significant than the positive coefficients on 
the variable Accessed Loans. Female borrowers, however, do not report any major 
improvement in their sense of empowerment after taking out a loan. In most 
instances the interaction term between a female client and accessing loans is 
insignificant.12 This lack of impact on empowerment for female borrowers as opposed 
to the wives of male borrowers may be due to their higher initial empowerment.  
Exploring heterogeneity in the sample, it again appears that rural households are 
driving the overall results (results for the urban and rural sub-sample, respectively 
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are not re[ported but are available from the authors). Urban households do not report 
much impact of program participation on female empowerment, with the exception of 
female borrowers, who report that accessing loans brings with it significantly more 
influence in household decisions as to whether or not to borrow money.  
 
 These results are interesting and may merit further examination since they counter 
conclusions of some earlier studies, which found that even when borrowers are 
women, they do not necessarily exert influence over key family decisions.13 The 
results here suggest that access to microfinance empowers women in the household, 
even if the woman herself is not the borrower.  
 
Impact on the core poor 
 
The millennium development goals are particularly concerned with the poorest 
quintile of the population – the core poor. But a common argument in the debate on 
commercially-oriented microfinance is that it cannot reach the core poor either 
because they are excluded by social networks or because they are too risk averse to 
participate to the same degree as other borrowers. To inform this debate, we look for 
heterogeneous impacts of the program on particularly poor households by 
introducing a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for households in the bottom 
quintile of consumption-expenditure for the sample. This dummy is interacted with 
M*T in equation (1) and the interaction term is introduced as an additional 
explanatory variable.  
 
The results are reported in tables 7 and 8 for the analysis of expenditure-
consumption and education and health impacts, respectively. Table 7 reports that, as 
expected, the expenditure of this group of core poor is significantly lower for three out 
of the four (all except health care!) measures of expenditure.   Including the 
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interaction term for the bottom quintile indicates no statistically significant differences 
in impact of borrowing to this group of very poor borrowers for expenditure, with the 
exception that borrowing under the program has a statistically weak positive impact 
on educational expenditures per child for the very poor. It should be noted this is a 
differential effect relative to non-core borrowers and is not strong enough to offset the 
disadvantage the core poor have due to their lower income.  
 
Insert Table 7 
 
Insert Table 8 
 
In relation to the education and health variables, as expected, the poorest 
households are less likely than the average to have their children enrolled in school 
or to have them vaccinated. However for the core poor who borrow under the 
program there is a positive effect on both of these probabilities that more than offsets 
this disadvantage. Table 8 shows that for columns  1 and 7 where the core poor 
access loans there is a significant positive coefficient estimate on the interaction 
between the core poor dummy and loan access, which is highly statistically 
significant and quantitatively larger than the negative coefficient estimates on the 
core poor dummy.  Borrowing under the program also statistically significantly 
increases the probability that children in core poor households receive ORS 
treatment for diarrheal disease, a significant killer of children under 5 in Pakistan.  
 
There is no evidence that for income generating activities in livestock rearing, arable 
farming or micro-enterprises there is any differential effect between core-poor 
borrowers and other borrowers.14 Thus we find no evidence the very poor borrowers 
are differentially affected in any major way relative to better-off borrowers in terms of 
monetary measures and access to loans appears to help in terms of their educational 
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and health status. This result challenges the applicability of some earlier research 
findings - where it has been found that it is the better-off poor who have most to gain 
from microfinance15– to the case of Pakistan.   
 
 
VI. Conclusions  
 
The form of microfinance practiced by the Khushhali bank involves small loans 
offered over short periods and at interest rates that are high relative to those in the 
formal banking sector. It is a clear example of second generation microfinance 
institutions that aim for financial sustainability to avoid reliance on donor funding. A 
key policy question is how far this commercial orientation dilutes the poverty reducing 
and welfare improving goals that are associated with the microfinance movement.  
This study addresses this issue empirically by linking the bank‟s lending activity with 
progress on a range of indicators that are consistent with progress towards the 
MDGs that form the center-piece of the government‟s poverty reduction strategy.  
 
The empirical analysis here provides little evidence that access to the Khushhali 
Bank‟s microcredit program has had positive impacts on monetary measures of 
welfare on aggregate, although there is evidence that rural households participating 
in the program have higher food expenditure.  However there is no impact on 
measures of income generating activities, either external sales or profits, for 
microenterprises or agricultural activities.  
 
In relation to non-monetary measures, access to loans does appear associated with 
a higher probability of medical treatment for children in the household and a higher 
probability that the provider of that treatment is trained. This appears to be an explicit 
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household choice not influenced by training or advice associated with the loan, but 
one which is clearly in line with the Millennium Development Goal to reduce child 
mortality.  
 
In terms of family dynamics, wives of male bank members who take out loans report 
greater empowerment in family decisions than wives of members who have not yet 
taken out a loan. The Millennium Development Goal to promote gender equality and 
female empowerment is particularly important in South Asia and this is evidence that 
microfinance in Pakistan is contributing towards this goal.   
 
For the very poorest households – those in the bottom quintile of the sample, or at 
less than half the official poverty line – there is no special impact on monetary 
indicators, but there is evidence that the poorest households share in the 
improvements in children‟s health care and even get some extra impacts. Amongst 
the very poor, borrowing increases the likelihood that children in the household are 
vaccinated and receive treatment (ORS) for diarrheal disease, a major killer of 
children under five in Pakistan. It also brings educational benefits, since the poorest 
borrowers report higher than expected educational expenditures per child and higher 
rates of children‟s enrollment in school. Here the loan or any additional income it 
creates appears to allow the poorest households to invest in children‟s health and 
education, again helping towards important MDG targets.   
 
Overall, we find no evidence that at the time of the survey the Khushhali bank has 
made much progress towards the goal of stimulating self-sustaining household 
income growth through either urban microenterprises or rural agricultural activities. 
These results are of concern for all who view the goal of microfinance as stimulating 
small scale income-generating activity. The survey was conducted in 2005 only five 
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years after the first loans were made and it is possible that cumulative income effects 
may build up over time through frequent repeat borrowing and repayment. 
 
However, we do find evidence that – at least in rural areas – the bank is contributing 
to the achievement of some of the MDGs by reducing poverty, empowering women 
and improving the health of children. The poorest households are also making 
progress on the goal of achieving universal primary education. Thus, these findings 
suggest that, given a supportive regulatory environment, it is possible for 
commercially-oriented microfinance banks to meet a “double bottom line” of 
simultaneously pursuing profits and a social mission to promote development.  
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Appendix : Details of Data Collection 
 
 
Design of the survey followed international guidelines, in particular those laid out in 
the three volume series by Grosh and Glewwe (2000) on the Living Standards and 
Measurement Survey (LSMS).  Full details of the questionnaire are in Montgomery 
(2005). 
 
i. Survey Instrument – Questionnaire 
 
Design of the survey instrument, the questionnaire to be used in gathering data for 
the study, was primarily guided by the research question: what has been the impact 
of the microfinance program on household welfare?  It was decided to include a 
relatively wide definition of welfare that includes non-economic measures of welfare 
such as education, health or empowerment.  
 
Core components of the LSMS were incorporated, and the final questionnaire also 
drew upon the AIMS-SEEP Impact Survey Tools (Assessing the Impacts of 
Microenterprise Services - Small Enterprise Education and Promotion Network ), 
impact assessment tools designed specifically for assessment of microfinance 
institutions, as well as several carefully designed questionnaires used in previous 
studies in Pakistan.  The findings of a nationwide participatory poverty assessment 
(Government of Pakistan (2004)) were also consulted and results of focus group 
discussions with Khushhali Bank clients were incorporated.   
 
Length of the questionnaire was limited to what could be reasonably delivered in a 
maximum of one hour if all components were asked.  In the final administration, most 
questionnaires took substantially less than one hour since very few households 
would actually respond to all sections.  The sequence of the questionnaire was 
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guided by the LSMS, and accordingly sensitive questions on finances or 
empowerment issues were administered last.   
 
To increase the accuracy of the information gathered and to enable the survey to 
address gender issues such as empowerment, both the male and female head of 
household were interviewed separately for each household.  The suitability of 
different components of the questionnaire for the male or female version was decided 
based on the previous questionnaires listed above and confirmed in pre-testing.  
The questionnaire was prepared simultaneously in English and Urdu and then 
translated into two regional languages: Pushto and Sindhi.  Accuracy of the 
translations was checked by back translation into the original language.   
 
ii. Implementation 
 
The survey was pre-tested on both client and non-client households and the final 
survey was implemented over an 8 week period after a major harvest when there 
would be many new villages and clients just getting access to Khushhali Bank 
services for the first time, making it easier to collect data on a suitable control group.   
 
The survey was carried out by an independent multinational survey company.  Male 
surveys were conducted by male surveyors and female surveys by female surveyors.  
Surveyors and supervisors for each team were recruited from local areas and 
interviews were conducted in local languages.  Since many of the surveyors were 
new, one week of classroom training on administration of surveys, and field testing of 
the surveyors‟ skill in both rural and urban areas were conducted.  Extra surveyors 
were trained in the event that any surveyor had to be replaced during the training, 
field-testing, or once the survey was underway, but that was not necessary.   
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iii. Quality Control 
 
Survey teams spent 3-4 days in each village included in the survey to allow time for 
the team supervisor to edit all completed questionnaires and back-check 15% of the 
fieldwork.  If any problems were discovered during back-checking, then 100% of that 
individual surveyors work was checked.  An independent quality control department 
similarly carried out back-checking of each supervisors work.  Data processing was 
not able to be conducted on-site due to cost considerations, and was instead done 
on edited questionnaires in a centralized location.  A data program was designed to 
automatically check the consistency of answers and in addition 10% of the data entry 
and coding was randomly back-checked.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics - Dependent Variables 
 
Variable Label     Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Income Generating Activities - Microenterprise: 
Sales      2881 37437 109191 0      1024000 
Profits-Reported    2881 13540 45040 0        700000 
 
Income Generating Activities - Livestock: 
Production/sales of livestock and products 2878 67931 278339 0      5549600 
Profits-reported from livestock  2878 61498 273627 –513000 5485000 
 
Income Generating Activities - Agriculture: 
Value of sales to third parties   2881 24453 76306 0       1345000 
 
Consumption-Expenditure: 
Monthly Consumption-Expenditure per capita:  Food 
      2859 863 555  0 8990 
Monthly Consumption-Expenditure per capita: Non-Food 
 2859 772 1316 38 4969 
Monthly Medical Expenditure per capita  2859 96 274  0 8333 
Educational expenses per child  2881  630 897 0 11900 
 
Education: 
Probability Children Enrolled in School  2881 0.44 0.44 0 1 
Absenteeism from School     2881 6.25 24 0 550   
 
Empowerment: 
Opinions taken into consideration in household decisions regarding: 
Child‟s Schooling    2881  0.58 0.49 0 1 
Child‟s Marriage    2881  0.39 0.48 0 1   
Whether to have another child  2881  0.23 0.42 0 1 
Type of Contraception to Use  2881 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Woman‟s participation in community/political activities 
 2881 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Woman‟s decision to work outside home 2881 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Repair/Construction of House  2881  0.34 0.47 0 1 
Sale/Purchase of Livestock   2881 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Borrowing Money    2881 0.36 0.48 0 1 
 
Health: 
Spending on medical care    2881 6834 23841 0         900000 
Probability seek medical treatment if ill  2881 0.60 0.48 0 1   
Probability of medical treatment from trained practitioner if ill 
 2881  0.57 0.48 0 1   
Ability to pay for medical treatment from own sources: 
2881 0.52 0.49 0 1   
Probability seek medical treatment if child ill  2881 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Probability of medical treatment from trained practitioner if child ill 
 2881   0.58 0.49 0 1 
Probability children vaccinated  2881 0.44 0.47 0 1 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics - Individual Household Characteristics 
 
 
Variable Label     Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Education of highest educated male (years) 2881   5.76 5.09 0 20 
Literacy of male     2881   1.38 1.41 0  9   
Numeracy of male     2881   1.68 1.45 0 9   
Male age 16-21    2881   0.52 0.76 0 4   
Male age 22-29    2881    0.51 0.76 0 5   
Male age 30-39    2881   0.43 0.61 0 4   
Male age 40-49    2881   0.31 0.48 0 3   
Male age 50-59    2881   0.20 0.40 0 2   
Male age over 60    2881 0.19 0.40 0 2   
Total Number Males in HH   2881 2.18 1.38 0 11   
Education of highest educated female(years)2881 2.41 3.94 0 16   
Literacy of female     2881   0.64 1.04 0 8   
Numeracy of female     2881 0.82 1.15 0 8   
Female age 16-21    2881 0.51 0.75 0 5 
Female age 22-29    2881 0.47 0.68 0 4   
Female age 30-39    2881 0.43 0.57 0 3   
Female age 40-49    2881 0.30 0.47 0 3   
Female age 50-59    2881 0.15 0.36 0 2   
Female age over 60    2881 0.33 0.56 0 4   
Total Number Females in HH   2881 3.78 1.93 0 14.5   
Children age 0-4    2881   0.98 1.11 0 9   
Children age 5-9    2881   1.19 1.23 0  8   
Children age 10-15    2881   1.10 1.21 0  9   
Generations Family in Village   2881 1.70 1.40 0 3   
Number of relatives in village   2881   43.71 59.73 0  600   
Household member holding office   2881  0.16 0.36 0 1   
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                                   Table 3A: Income Generating Activities  
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
1 2 3 4 5
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sales of 
Livestock 
and 
Products
Profits 
from 
Livestock 
and 
Products
Agricultural 
Sales to 
Third Parties
Sales of 
Microenterprise
Profits from 
Microenterprise
Education of highest educated female-8,037.24 -7,648.64 -1,715.33 1,895.70 990.95
[5,299.45] [5,287.66] [541.60]*** [792.70]** [327.72]***
Literacy of female 16,079.04 16,898.63 -8,389.67 1,920.28 1,556.98
[26,518.75] [26,459.77] [2,710.19]*** [3,931.67] [1,625.43]
Numeracy of female 373.87 -1,089.66 9,329.90 2,206.16 -706.91
[21,493.53] [21,445.73] [2,196.62]*** [3,222.45] [1,332.23]
Education of highest educated male374.88 495.33 54.1 186.35 467.08
[3,703.89] [3,695.66] [378.53] [550.67] [227.66]**
Literacy of male -34,912.72 -33,577.21 -529.82 2,893.08 1,789.02
[23,431.75] [23,379.64] [2,394.70] [3,473.62] [1,436.07]
Numeracy of male 49,729.04 46,850.80 7,033.08 7,433.76 777.11
[22,995.09]** [22,943.95]** [2,350.07]*** [3,418.93]** [1,413.46]
Family generations in village 22,621.43 22,881.38 3,523.30 -6,366.44 -820.91
[14,050.53] [14,019.28] [1,435.95]** [2,087.08]*** [862.84]
Household member holding office97,140.27 93,757.29 18,761.91 12,410.47 2,972.30
[39,007.15]** [38,920.40]** [3,986.49]*** [5,782.82]** [2,390.74]
Number of relatives in village 34.9 15.41 47.19 54.37 5.09
[248.32] [247.76] [25.38]* [37.34] [15.44]
Children age 0-4 42,691.59 41,480.78 4,978.10 1,881.59 1,012.85
[14,218.26]***[14,186.64]*** [1,453.09]*** [2,121.00] [876.87]
Children age 5-9 -4,114.45 -4,195.07 1,984.22 1821.97 159.04
[12,497.39] [12,469.60] [1,277.22] [1,852.22] [765.74]
Children age 10-15 5,942.89 5,542.95 849.36 5,903.80 2,371.32
[12,224.27] [12,197.09] [1,249.31] [1,810.53]*** [748.51]***
Female age 16-21 -9,111.58 -9,604.08 3,503.41 -5,987.14 -1,652.97
[21,251.12] [21,203.86] [2,171.84] [3,151.55]* [1,302.91]
Female age 22-29 14,139.35 12,870.64 5,186.28 -5,620.76 -2,402.94
[24,816.33] [24,761.14] [2,536.20]** [3,674.96] [1,519.30]
Female age 30-39 18,058.68 16,462.14 9,256.75 -1,274.31 304.92
[31,075.80] [31,006.69] [3,175.91]*** [4,601.20] [1,902.23]
Female age 40-49 33,096.96 32,329.28 11,653.38 -4,197.08 165.93
[36,120.24] [36,039.90] [3,691.45]*** [5,348.43] [2,211.15]
Female age 50-59 11,723.19 10,546.64 6,223.90 -3,166.86 178.67
[41,069.01] [40,977.68] [4,197.21] [6,081.74] [2,514.32]
Female age over 60 17,252.13 16,814.30 -1,265.34 3,884.98 1,587.88
[26,736.64] [26,677.18] [2,732.46] [3,958.82] [1,636.66]
Male age 16-21 -23,761.67 -23,372.43 -4,436.85 -5,749.95 -265.05
[24,705.39] [24,650.44] [2,524.86]* [3,657.79] [1,512.20]
Male age 22-29 -20,641.02 -20,019.49 -5,482.66 1,837.71 1,287.39
[25,029.46] [24,973.80] [2,557.98]** [3,706.75] [1,532.45]
Male age 30-39 -29,463.27 -28,459.80 2,954.73 -1,646.90 -937.47
[29,283.60] [29,218.47] [2,992.75] [4,343.33] [1,795.62]
Male age 40-49 -67,116.44 -66,535.77 5,290.36 -1,717.20 -1,342.02
[35,461.86]* [35,383.00]* [3,624.16] [5,270.72] [2,179.02]
Male age 50-59 -60,074.16 -60,115.56 6,978.30 77.44 -4585.35
[40,515.53] [40,425.43] [4,140.64]* [6,011.15] [2,485.13]*
Male age over 60 -6,357.66 -8,204.87 765.51 -15,562.28 -4,130.90
[37,895.99] [37,811.71] [3,872.93] [5,612.45]*** [2,320.30]*
Kushaili Bank Client -11,360.84 -12,001.04 14,929.48 12,113.51 2,026.50
[51,252.12] [51,138.14] [5,237.91]*** [7,596.04] [3,140.36]
Urban Client 12,746.88 15,131.12
[26,814.68] [11,085.74]
Accessed Loans 39,248.24 37,989.37 -4,076.68 -9,926.26 -2,104.70
[52,020.57] [51,904.88] [5,316.45] [8,110.92] [3,353.22]
Urban*Accessed Loans 49,282.35 14,862.33
[9,192.36]*** [3,800.31]***
Constant -17,568.54 -12,041.60 -30,411.01 1,091.67 -9,090.50
[53,186.66] [53,068.37] [5,435.62]*** [35,655.47] [14,740.70]
Observations 1678 1678 1226 837 837
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Table 3B: Income Generating Activities – only URBAN  
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
1 2 3 4
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sales of 
Livestock 
and 
Products
Profits 
from 
Livestock 
and 
Products
Sales of 
Microenterprise
Profits from 
Microenterprise
Education of highest educated female-87.28 -89.90 174.20 1,198.42
[113.385] [100.635] [1,766.442] [776.705]
Literacy of female 976.16 743.18 5,258.45 2,483.58
[807.720] [716.896] [12,583.648] [5,533.032]
Numeracy of female -545.88 23.72 -1,452.80 -5,591.14
[755.515] [670.561] [11,770.331] [5,175.416]
Education of highest educated male50.18 9.75 996.76 1,596.90**
[94.560] [83.927] [1,473.175] [647.755]
Literacy of male -1,671.75*** -1,068.55* -4,007.14 -1,680.80
[620.496] [550.724] [9,666.849] [4,250.515]
Numeracy of male 668.30 588.43 22,060.76* 727.96
[727.819] [645.979] [11,338.845] [4,985.692]
Children age 0-4 -141.11 143.74 2,431.93 3,553.47
[419.064] [371.942] [6,528.681] [2,870.662]
Children age 5-9 -231.61 -417.33 9,579.41* 2,393.44
[363.960] [323.035] [5,670.218] [2,493.196]
Children age 10-15 262.64 84.60 7,324.89 5,623.96**
[336.089] [298.297] [5,236.003] [2,302.271]
Female age 16-21 624.34 208.35 -1,554.65 -1,410.51
[583.554] [517.936] [9,091.317] [3,997.453]
Female age 22-29 -225.39 -597.99 -1,081.98 4,713.34
[695.763] [617.528] [10,839.445] [4,766.105]
Female age 30-39 226.14 -576.71 17,178.14 5,915.01
[905.684] [803.844] [14,109.844] [6,204.100]
Female age 40-49 78.84 -372.92 2,115.29 -1,824.06
[1,003.365] [890.541] [15,631.642] [6,873.235]
Female age 50-59 -950.24 -1,141.98 -4,061.57 4,628.76
[1,062.244] [942.799] [16,548.921] [7,276.563]
Female age over 60 -63.81 -207.11 11,796.64 -2,764.26
[752.587] [667.962] [11,724.719] [5,155.361]
Male age 16-21 804.29 365.40 -11,674.70 973.93
[740.746] [657.453] [11,540.248] [5,074.249]
Male age 22-29 869.09 128.75 -8,376.52 2,790.76
[739.961] [656.756] [11,528.011] [5,068.868]
Male age 30-39 790.25 288.04 -4,802.94 -1,472.38
[902.532] [801.046] [14,060.740] [6,182.509]
Male age 40-49 690.77 438.18 -17,317.28 -3,288.98
[1,062.751] [943.249] [16,556.821] [7,280.037]
Male age 50-59 1,781.97 1,579.80 -10,833.39 -236.10
[1,136.122] [1,008.370] [17,699.892] [7,782.645]
Male age over 60 383.07 319.67 -42,437.31** -4,450.65
[1,100.593] [976.836] [17,146.371] [7,539.262]
Kushaili Bank Client -92.90 134.99 19,930.09 5,028.76
[1,233.405] [1,094.715] [19,215.490] [8,449.054]
Accessed Loans 1,255.26 1,083.91 34,326.88* 10,621.15
[1,255.775] [1,114.569] [19,563.991] [8,602.290]
Constant 492.13 -193.66 -31,796.02 -2,103.95
[2,424.923] [2,152.251] [37,778.393] [16,611.165]
Observations 732 732 732 732
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Table 3C: Income Generating Activities – only RURAL 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
1 2 3 4 5
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sales of 
Livestock 
and 
Products
Profits 
from 
Livestock 
and 
Products
Agricultural 
Sales to 
Third Parties
Sales of 
Microenterprise
Profits from 
Microenterprise
Education of highest educated female-9,419.95 -9,113.81 -1,800.99** 3,266.46*** 1,094.18***
[7,942.303] [7,927.350] [794.324] [858.810] [333.490]
Literacy of female 32,134.68 32,067.00 -5,320.53 133.33 1,517.94
[35,415.703] [35,349.024] [3,541.988] [3,829.540] [1,487.074]
Numeracy of female -14,547.74 -15,166.33 6,628.24** 3,061.67 166.64
[27,311.915] [27,260.493] [2,731.513] [2,953.268] [1,146.803]
Education of highest educated male1,741.18 1,841.57 379.34 -203.03 81.72
[5,057.976] [5,048.453] [505.857] [546.925] [212.380]
Literacy of male -38,656.89 -37,632.09 1,625.59 3,867.75 2,556.28*
[31,348.861] [31,289.839] [3,135.255] [3,389.788] [1,316.311]
Numeracy of male 54,141.21* 51,239.00* 5,954.78** 5,690.36* 896.23
[29,890.054] [29,833.778] [2,989.358] [3,232.045] [1,255.057]
Family generations in village 27,053.32 26,893.84 5,053.44*** -5,940.59*** -875.52
[16,466.208] [16,435.206] [1,646.815] [1,780.510] [691.401]
Household member holding office90,081.52** 87,473.48* 15,802.90*** 12,616.81** 3,058.17
[45,644.387] [45,558.450] [4,564.976] [4,935.579] [1,916.567]
Number of relatives in village -102.29 -109.81 0.73 54.21* 8.20
[292.503] [291.952] [29.254] [31.629] [12.282]
Children age 0-4 46,307.70** 45,385.14** 3,611.66* 1,883.26 520.77
[18,577.592] [18,542.615] [1,857.978] [2,008.816] [780.056]
Children age 5-9 -7,599.28 -7,463.37 1,610.28 88.25 -283.86
[16,194.742] [16,164.251] [1,619.665] [1,751.156] [680.003]
Children age 10-15 6,628.74 6,341.14 291.13 5,139.78*** 1,373.41**
[16,197.718] [16,167.222] [1,619.963] [1,751.478] [680.128]
Female age 16-21 -8,826.23 -9,633.36 5,275.96* -6,308.55** -1,310.39
[28,408.265] [28,354.779] [2,841.161] [3,071.818] [1,192.838]
Female age 22-29 20,370.87 18,753.25 6,943.17** -6,784.02* -3,944.55***
[32,736.816] [32,675.181] [3,274.067] [3,539.869] [1,374.590]
Female age 30-39 17,602.55 16,111.77 9,847.48** -5,056.57 -835.40
[40,536.339] [40,460.019] [4,054.111] [4,383.240] [1,702.085]
Female age 40-49 40,446.30 39,727.06 13,488.12*** -4,213.81 1,891.61
[47,565.889] [47,476.334] [4,757.149] [5,143.353] [1,997.249]
Female age 50-59 9,471.83 8,412.80 4,951.83 -1,220.85 -1,248.59
[55,276.697] [55,172.625] [5,528.321] [5,977.132] [2,321.019]
Female age over 60 22,939.30 22,421.52 -1,308.88 1,300.51 2,458.63*
[34,981.050] [34,915.189] [3,498.517] [3,782.540] [1,468.823]
Male age 16-21 -31,707.26 -31,312.91 -5,136.59 -5,314.17 -89.79
[32,399.999] [32,338.997] [3,240.382] [3,503.448] [1,360.447]
Male age 22-29 -18,642.52 -18,120.90 -5,953.34* 3,428.13 741.39
[32,923.789] [32,861.801] [3,292.767] [3,560.086] [1,382.440]
Male age 30-39 -26,077.97 -25,225.66 5,230.14 -2,137.60 -974.62
[37,750.868] [37,679.792] [3,775.532] [4,082.044] [1,585.125]
Male age 40-49 -73,013.59 -73,181.26 10,128.99** 1,703.29 -855.08
[46,212.358] [46,125.351] [4,621.780] [4,996.995] [1,940.416]
Male age 50-59 -70,594.37 -71,653.79 12,801.33** 3,324.26 -4,673.32**
[53,721.688] [53,620.543] [5,372.802] [5,808.987] [2,255.726]
Male age over 60 -8,884.02 -11,253.32 972.77 -9,102.23* -3,460.19*
[49,510.294] [49,417.078] [4,951.613] [5,353.604] [2,078.893]
Kushaili Bank Client -16,341.25 -17,679.95 21,518.26*** 10,971.24 2,348.89
[70,785.996] [70,652.723] [7,079.434] [7,654.170] [2,972.241]
Accessed Loans 47,312.25 46,522.68 -8,781.92 -8,791.19 -2,477.09
[71,763.927] [71,628.813] [7,177.238] [7,759.915] [3,013.303]
Constant 722,392.60** 661,284.70** 218,669.85*** 31,034.11 -5,641.70
[307,437.703][306,858.873] [30,747.392] [33,243.586] [12,909.034]
Observations 2149 2149 2149 2149 2149
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Table 4A: Indicators of Poverty: Consumption-Expenditure 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Monthly 
Expenditure per 
Capita - Food
Monthly 
Expenditure per 
Capita - Non-
Food
Monthly 
Expenditure per 
Capita - Health 
Care
Expenditure on 
Education (per 
child)
Education of highest educated female 0.52 13.55 -0.34 44.61
[3.86] [9.73] [2.07] [6.08]***
Literacy of female 35.54 -50.72 -15.23 43.94
[19.14]* [48.30] [10.27] [30.43]
Numeracy of female -23.1 39.84 20.1 -31.52
[15.50] [39.12] [8.32]** [24.66]
Education of highest educated male 3.9 27.97 2.82 35.54
[2.69] [6.78]*** [1.44]* [4.25]***
Literacy of male 23.36 33.06 -3.01 38.31
[16.93] [42.71] [9.08] [26.89]
Numeracy of male -35.2 16.6 6.26 -17.57
[16.59]** [41.87] [8.90] [26.38]
Family generations in village 19.39 2.17 -0.53 -13.5
[10.17]* [25.66] [5.46] [16.12]
Household member holding office -45.08 238.12 -11.71 12.64
[28.11] [70.93]*** [15.09] [44.76]
Number of relatives in village 1.2 0.9 0.26 0.55
[0.18]*** [0.46]** [0.10]*** [0.28]*
Children age 0-4 -58.37 -34.44 2.45 -18.42
[10.25]*** [25.86] [5.50] [16.31]
Children age 5-9 -60.11 -52.77 -7.92 43.47
[9.01]*** [22.74]** [4.84] [14.34]***
Children age 10-15 -39.89 -17.86 -4.21 134.53
[8.82]*** [22.27] [4.74] [14.03]***
Female age 16-21 -65.82 -73.7 -1.88 -18.27
[15.36]*** [38.76]* [8.24] [24.38]
Female age 22-29 -30.77 -61.04 -11.63 -42.82
[17.90]* [45.16] [9.60] [28.47]
Female age 30-39 -10.07 -69.38 -14.95 28.58
[22.46] [56.68] [12.05] [35.66]
Female age 40-49 -69.83 -79.48 -17.76 111.73
[26.15]*** [65.99] [14.04] [41.44]***
Female age 50-59 -96.3 7.57 -31.74 -17.61
[29.66]*** [74.84] [15.92]** [47.12]
Female age over 60 -77.5 -89.4 14.62 -21.99
[19.27]*** [48.64]* [10.34] [30.68]
Male age 16-21 -96.54 -136.14 -9.03 -79.49
[17.82]*** [44.97]*** [9.56] [28.35]***
Male age 22-29 -29.67 -67.68 -5.01 -78.86
[18.07] [45.59] [9.70] [28.72]***
Male age 30-39 -16.85 23.66 -3.49 26.93
[21.20] [53.51] [11.38] [33.60]
Male age 40-49 12.01 16.86 -0.8 50.41
[25.71] [64.89] [13.80] [40.69]
Male age 50-59 -34.22 112.63 21.29 15
[29.34] [74.05] [15.75] [46.49]
Male age over 60 -61.09 -67.12 3.29 -85.61
[27.35]** [69.01] [14.68] [43.48]**
Kushaili Bank client (0/1) -30.66 95.43 -48.64 43.81
[37.07] [93.54] [19.89]** [58.81]
Accessed Loans 52.14 -25.2 40.7 -4.8
[37.63] [94.96] [20.20]** [59.69]
Constant 1,191.18 1,062.19 111.43 199.09
[38.67]*** [97.59]*** [20.75]*** [61.03]***
Observations 2876 2876 2876 2876
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Table 4B: Indicators of Poverty: Consumption- Expenditure – only URBAN 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
1 2 3 4
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Monthly 
Expenditure per 
Capita - Food
Monthly 
Expenditure per 
Capita - Non-
Food
Monthly 
Expenditure per 
Capita - Health 
Care
Expenditure on 
Education (per 
child)
Education of highest educated female -5.58 25.03** 1.97 38.79***
[5.234] [12.669] [3.674] [12.313]
Literacy of female 34.12 -35.03 54.75** 8.89
[36.555] [88.478] [25.658] [87.714]
Numeracy of female -4.94 -40.81 -45.88* -17.70
[34.151] [82.661] [23.971] [82.045]
Education of highest educated male 5.02 31.98*** 4.04 16.70
[4.363] [10.559] [3.062] [10.269]
Literacy of male 65.85** -77.62 -29.14 60.15
[28.424] [68.798] [19.951] [67.382]
Numeracy of male -24.24 83.63 12.64 21.35
[33.082] [80.074] [23.220] [79.037]
Children age 0-4 -59.89*** -50.64 7.82 -57.30
[18.999] [45.985] [13.335] [45.508]
Children age 5-9 -47.34*** -48.01 -7.29 118.78***
[16.464] [39.849] [11.556] [39.524]
Children age 10-15 -37.75** -19.36 9.15 139.85***
[15.304] [37.043] [10.742] [36.497]
Female age 16-21 -75.88*** -54.03 -12.48 -48.93
[26.676] [64.566] [18.723] [63.371]
Female age 22-29 -32.05 -57.36 8.61 -62.74
[31.543] [76.348] [22.140] [75.556]
Female age 30-39 1.20 -60.68 -28.72 96.71
[41.216] [99.760] [28.929] [98.352]
Female age 40-49 -56.50 -64.42 -62.52* 142.14
[45.733] [110.693] [32.100] [108.960]
Female age 50-59 -70.97 -65.54 -68.58** 86.75
[48.471] [117.321] [34.022] [115.354]
Female age over 60 -68.53** -124.43 -8.21 -28.43
[34.109] [82.558] [23.941] [81.727]
Male age 16-21 -139.02*** -152.98* 14.05 -195.96**
[33.600] [81.326] [23.583] [80.441]
Male age 22-29 -71.24** -82.63 5.33 -81.05
[33.571] [81.256] [23.563] [80.356]
Male age 30-39 -51.72 92.40 6.26 52.37
[41.262] [99.873] [28.962] [98.010]
Male age 40-49 -6.00 99.24 14.79 122.61
[48.777] [118.061] [34.236] [115.409]
Male age 50-59 -17.21 77.99 47.61 -18.17
[52.073] [126.038] [36.550] [123.376]
Male age over 60 -170.47*** -30.18 41.73 -274.43**
[50.149] [121.381] [35.199] [119.518]
Kushaili Bank client (0/1) 16.23 -96.51 -40.57 -48.50
[56.553] [136.883] [39.694] [133.941]
Accessed Loans -17.15 99.95 36.28 196.63
[57.598] [139.411] [40.427] [136.370]
Constant 969.72*** 1,631.97*** 224.83*** -35.60
[111.001] [268.670] [77.911] [263.333]
Observations 720 720 720 720
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Table 4C: Indicators of Poverty: Consumption-Expenditure – only RURAL 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
1 2 3 4
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Monthly 
Expenditure per 
Capita - Food
Monthly 
Expenditure per 
Capita - Non-
Food
Monthly 
Expenditure per 
Capita - Health 
Care
Expenditure on 
Education (per 
child)
Education of highest educated female -0.79 8.43 0.12 44.95***
[5.198] [13.335] [2.603] [7.119]
Literacy of female 19.60 -39.59 -28.54** 52.36*
[23.133] [59.351] [11.586] [31.746]
Numeracy of female -10.71 55.84 26.69*** -15.80
[17.855] [45.809] [8.943] [24.482]
Education of highest educated male 0.99 25.42*** 3.01* 38.29***
[3.308] [8.488] [1.657] [4.534]
Literacy of male 4.40 79.43 6.15 28.36
[20.477] [52.537] [10.256] [28.100]
Numeracy of male -20.67 -17.37 -0.16 -15.53
[19.512] [50.060] [9.772] [26.792]
Family generations in village 13.31 -1.15 0.15 -13.96
[10.800] [27.709] [5.409] [14.760]
Household member holding office -31.80 232.15*** -13.48 2.20
[29.805] [76.469] [14.928] [40.914]
Number of relatives in village 1.40*** 0.90* 0.22** 0.76***
[0.193] [0.494] [0.096] [0.262]
Children age 0-4 -46.14*** -32.15 -0.36 -1.67
[12.128] [31.117] [6.074] [16.652]
Children age 5-9 -60.10*** -53.98** -8.54 27.58*
[10.579] [27.141] [5.298] [14.516]
Children age 10-15 -35.98*** -25.28 -9.25* 128.51***
[10.583] [27.152] [5.300] [14.519]
Female age 16-21 -66.65*** -72.91 1.21 -7.55
[18.547] [47.585] [9.289] [25.464]
Female age 22-29 -35.58* -48.67 -16.67 -35.19
[21.380] [54.852] [10.708] [29.344]
Female age 30-39 -9.66 -67.00 -12.14 13.28
[26.511] [68.018] [13.278] [36.335]
Female age 40-49 -70.15** -82.12 -5.54 121.94***
[31.186] [80.010] [15.619] [42.637]
Female age 50-59 -96.12*** 40.46 -22.22 -32.90
[36.087] [92.585] [18.074] [49.548]
Female age over 60 -81.93*** -73.95 21.30* -18.98
[22.839] [58.596] [11.439] [31.356]
Male age 16-21 -91.01*** -125.56** -13.64 -44.77
[21.167] [54.307] [10.602] [29.042]
Male age 22-29 -24.63 -58.22 -5.86 -88.87***
[21.519] [55.210] [10.778] [29.512]
Male age 30-39 -21.17 4.59 -3.97 15.44
[24.727] [63.441] [12.385] [33.839]
Male age 40-49 -9.83 -5.19 1.22 13.39
[30.293] [77.721] [15.172] [41.423]
Male age 50-59 -66.00* 142.82 21.90 21.01
[35.200] [90.308] [17.630] [48.154]
Male age over 60 -37.35 -73.20 -0.37 -45.81
[32.331] [82.949] [16.193] [44.379]
Kushaili Bank client (0/1) -59.91 195.97* -40.65* 90.11
[46.198] [118.527] [23.138] [63.450]
Accessed Loans 94.56** -100.30 30.37 -83.36
[46.843] [120.180] [23.461] [64.327]
Constant 22.13 924.80* 315.25*** -615.56**
[201.073] [515.876] [100.707] [275.577]
Observations 2139 2139 2139 2149
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Table 5: Indicators of Poverty: Education and Health 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT
Education: 
Probability 
Children 
Enrolled in 
School
Education: 
Days Children 
Absent from 
School
Health: 
Probability 
seek 
medical 
treatment if 
ill
Health:  
Probability 
medical 
treatment from 
trained 
professional
Health: Able 
to pay for 
medical 
treatment 
from own 
assets
Health: 
Probability 
seek 
medical 
treatment if 
child ill
Health: 
Probability 
medical 
treatment from 
trained 
professional if 
child ill
Health: 
Probability take 
ORS to treat 
diarrhea
Health: 
Probability 
children 
vaccinated
Education of highest educated female 0.06 0.26 -0.1 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 0.02
[0.02]*** [0.17] [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.03]** [0.02]
Literacy of female 0.04 -0.37 -0.44 -0.12 -0.31 -0.17 -0.04 -0.04 0.14
[0.10] [0.87] [0.11]*** [0.09] [0.09]*** [0.10]* [0.10] [0.11] [0.12]
Numeracy of female 0.08 -1.68 0.75 0.4 0.57 0.15 0.02 0.01 -0.02
[0.08] [0.71]** [0.10]*** [0.08]*** [0.08]*** [0.08]* [0.08] [0.09] [0.09]
Education of highest educated male 0.09 0.19 0 -0.01 0 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.02
[0.01]*** [0.12] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]*
Literacy of male 0.25 3.4 -0.34 -0.27 -0.14 0.08 0.08 0 0.3
[0.08]*** [0.77]*** [0.08]*** [0.08]*** [0.07]* [0.09] [0.09] [0.10] [0.10]***
Numeracy of male -0.13 -3.66 0.41 0.32 0.23 0.07 0.04 0.2 -0.23
[0.08] [0.75]*** [0.08]*** [0.07]*** [0.07]*** [0.08] [0.08] [0.11]* [0.10]**
Family generations in village -0.05 0.49 0.05 0.09 0.1 0.05 0.1 -0.1 -0.04
[0.05] [0.46] [0.04] [0.04]** [0.04]** [0.05] [0.05]** [0.06] [0.06]
Household member holding office 0.19 2.52 0.31 0.3 0.27 0.09 0.1 0.31 0.07
[0.13] [1.28]** [0.12]** [0.12]** [0.12]** [0.14] [0.14] [0.17]* [0.15]
Number of relatives in village 0 -0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.00]*** [0.01]** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00] [0.00]***
Children age 0-4 0.07 -0.1 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 1.22 1.17 0.54 1.92
[0.05] [0.47] [0.04]** [0.04]* [0.04] [0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.08]***
Children age 5-9 0.64 3.23 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.37
[0.05]*** [0.41]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.05]*** [0.05]***
Children age 10-15 0.77 1.41 0.1 0.08 0.08 -0.05 -0.08 -0.18 -0.01
[0.05]*** [0.40]*** [0.04]** [0.04]** [0.04]** [0.04] [0.04]* [0.06]*** [0.05]
Female age 16-21 0.04 0.97 0.03 0.03 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.08 -0.2
[0.07] [0.70] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.08] [0.08] [0.10] [0.09]**
Female age 22-29 -0.19 1.54 -0.02 -0.02 0 0.11 0.14 0.11 0
[0.09]** [0.81]* [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.09] [0.09] [0.12] [0.10]
Female age 30-39 -0.06 1.26 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.15 -0.25
[0.11] [1.02] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.11] [0.11] [0.14] [0.12]**
Female age 40-49 0.09 2.84 0.24 0.23 0.16 -0.35 -0.32 -0.03 -0.33
[0.13] [1.19]** [0.11]** [0.11]** [0.11] [0.13]*** [0.13]** [0.18] [0.14]**
Female age 50-59 -0.29 1.64 0.41 0.41 0.26 -0.18 -0.2 0.06 -0.03
[0.14]** [1.35] [0.13]*** [0.13]*** [0.12]** [0.15] [0.15] [0.20] [0.16]
Female age over 60 -0.07 0.77 0.31 0.29 0.18 -0.02 -0.09 0.2 0.08
[0.09] [0.88] [0.08]*** [0.08]*** [0.08]** [0.09] [0.09] [0.11]* [0.11]
Male age 16-21 -0.16 0.42 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.2 -0.17 -0.24 -0.27
[0.09]* [0.81] [0.07]* [0.07]* [0.07]* [0.09]** [0.09]* [0.13]* [0.10]***
Male age 22-29 -0.36 0.35 -0.03 0 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.21 -0.07
[0.09]*** [0.82] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.09] [0.09] [0.13] [0.10]
Male age 30-39 0.03 1.8 -0.14 -0.12 -0.13 -0.29 -0.22 -0.3 0.02
[0.11] [0.96]* [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.11]*** [0.11]** [0.15]** [0.11]
Male age 40-49 0.04 1.98 -0.28 -0.28 -0.26 -0.26 -0.18 -0.31 -0.27
[0.13] [1.16]* [0.11]** [0.11]*** [0.11]** [0.13]** [0.13] [0.17]* [0.14]*
Male age 50-59 0.12 1.04 -0.1 -0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.05 -0.23 -0.16
[0.14] [1.33] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.15] [0.15] [0.21] [0.16]
Male age over 60 -0.16 0.4 -0.13 -0.13 -0.06 -0.25 -0.11 -0.16 -0.24
[0.13] [1.24] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11] [0.14]* [0.14] [0.18] [0.15]
Kushaili Bank client (0/1) 0.4 1.68 0.15 0.14 0.24 -0.24 -0.21 0.16 -0.03
[0.18]** [1.68] [0.16] [0.15] [0.15] [0.18] [0.18] [0.24] [0.20]
Implied Odds Ratio 1.5 1.16 1.14 1.27 0.79 0.81 1.17 0.98
Accessed Loans -0.21 -1.06 -0.01 0 -0.15 0.45 0.45 0.08 0.14
[0.18] [1.71] [0.16] [0.15] [0.15] [0.19]** [0.19]** [0.25] [0.20]
Implied Odds Ratio 1.5 1.07 1.06 0.94 1.47 1.44 0.92 0.98
Constant -1.81 -5.43 -0.21 -0.13 -0.44 -1.87 -1.86 -3.14 -1.7
[0.19]*** [1.75]*** [0.16] [0.16] [0.16]*** [0.20]*** [0.20]*** [0.27]*** [0.22]***
Observations 2876 2876 2876 2876 2876 2876 2876 2876 2876
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Table 6- Female Empowerment 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT
Child's 
schooling
Child's 
marriage
Whether to 
have another 
child
Repair-
Construction 
of house
Sale-Purchase 
of livestock
Borrowing 
money
Woman's 
participation 
in community-
political 
activities
Woman's 
decision to 
work outside 
home
Education of highest educated female 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.12 -0.11 -0.1 -0.01
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.03]*** [0.02]
Literacy of female 0.27 0.03 0.39 0.14 0.32 0.24 0.65 0.39
[0.08]*** [0.08] [0.12]*** [0.09] [0.10]*** [0.09]*** [0.16]*** [0.13]***
Numeracy of female -0.3 -0.09 -0.32 0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.26 -0.21
[0.07]*** [0.07] [0.11]*** [0.07] [0.08] [0.07] [0.15]* [0.12]*
Education of highest educated male 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01
[0.01]* [0.01] [0.01]*** [0.01]* [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
Literacy of male 0.08 0 -0.08 -0.1 -0.36 -0.28 0.43 0.37
[0.07] [0.08] [0.11] [0.08] [0.09]*** [0.08]*** [0.16]*** [0.13]***
Numeracy of male 0.08 0 -0.09 0.38 0.47 0.45 -0.41 -0.31
[0.07] [0.08] [0.10] [0.09]*** [0.09]*** [0.08]*** [0.16]** [0.13]**
Family generations in village 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.07 0.01 0.06
[0.04] [0.05] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05]*** [0.05] [0.07] [0.07]
Household member holding office 0.26 0.32 0.3 0.51 0.46 0.57 0.06 0.11
[0.12]** [0.12]** [0.16]* [0.13]*** [0.14]*** [0.13]*** [0.21] [0.18]
Number of relatives in village 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.01 0
[0.00]** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]*** [0.00]***
Children age 0-4 0.05 -0.01 0.27 0.1 0.2 0.15 0.13 0.13
[0.04] [0.05] [0.06]*** [0.05]* [0.05]*** [0.05]*** [0.08]* [0.06]**
Children age 5-9 0.2 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.1
[0.04]*** [0.04]** [0.05] [0.04]*** [0.05]*** [0.04]*** [0.07]** [0.06]*
Children age 10-15 0.1 -0.05 -0.02 0 -0.02 -0.01 -0.17 -0.07
[0.04]*** [0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.07]** [0.06]
Female age 16-21 0.23 0.39 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.12 -0.04
[0.06]*** [0.07]*** [0.09]* [0.08] [0.08]* [0.07]** [0.12] [0.10]
Female age 22-29 0.28 0.35 0.05 0.04 0.17 0.14 -0.18 -0.02
[0.08]*** [0.08]*** [0.11] [0.09] [0.10]* [0.09] [0.15] [0.12]
Female age 30-39 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.16 0.35 0.24 0.08 0
[0.09]*** [0.10]*** [0.13]*** [0.11] [0.12]*** [0.11]** [0.17] [0.15]
Female age 40-49 -0.11 0.42 -0.09 -0.14 -0.08 -0.04 -0.4 -0.22
[0.11] [0.11]*** [0.15] [0.13] [0.14] [0.13] [0.21]* [0.17]
Female age 50-59 -0.67 -0.11 -0.73 -0.43 -0.44 -0.49 -0.29 -0.51
[0.13]*** [0.14] [0.20]*** [0.16]*** [0.18]** [0.16]*** [0.25] [0.21]**
Female age over 60 -0.22 -0.21 -0.27 -0.27 -0.34 -0.24 -0.38 -0.41
[0.08]*** [0.09]** [0.11]** [0.10]*** [0.11]*** [0.10]** [0.16]** [0.13]***
Male age 16-21 -0.19 0.03 -0.17 -0.25 -0.12 -0.25 0.12 -0.04
[0.08]** [0.08] [0.11] [0.10]** [0.10] [0.10]*** [0.14] [0.12]
Male age 22-29 -0.25 -0.1 -0.15 -0.25 -0.12 -0.23 -0.08 -0.13
[0.08]*** [0.08] [0.12] [0.10]** [0.11] [0.10]** [0.15] [0.12]
Male age 30-39 -0.22 -0.19 -0.19 -0.48 -0.51 -0.48 -0.07 -0.16
[0.09]** [0.10]* [0.13] [0.12]*** [0.13]*** [0.12]*** [0.17] [0.14]
Male age 40-49 -0.21 -0.29 -0.32 -0.52 -0.48 -0.64 -0.32 -0.12
[0.11]** [0.12]** [0.15]** [0.14]*** [0.15]*** [0.13]*** [0.20] [0.17]
Male age 50-59 -0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.32 -0.52 -0.52 -0.09 0.11
[0.12] [0.13] [0.17] [0.15]** [0.17]*** [0.15]*** [0.23] [0.18]
Male age over 60 -0.15 0.04 -0.23 -0.38 -0.44 -0.46 -0.4 -0.31
[0.11] [0.12] [0.17] [0.15]*** [0.16]*** [0.14]*** [0.24]* [0.19]
Khushaili Bank Client (0/1) -0.37 -0.38 -0.57 -0.46 -0.79 -0.55 -0.3 -0.17
[0.19]* [0.23]* [0.32]* [0.27]* [0.31]** [0.27]** [0.40] [0.32]
0.69 0.69 0.57 0.63 0.45 0.58 0.74 0.85
Female Khushhali Bank Client (0/1) 0.22 0.45 -0.01 0.36 -0.12 0.96 -1.16 -0.6
[0.30] [0.34] [0.51] [0.40] [0.57] [0.38]** [1.08] [0.60]
1.25 1.57 0.99 1.43 0.88 2.62 0.31 0.55
Accessed Loans 0.49 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.84 0.67 0.19 0.25
[0.20]** [0.24]*** [0.33]* [0.28]** [0.32]*** [0.28]** [0.42] [0.33]
Implied Odds Ratio 1.63 1.90 1.86 1.85 2.31 1.95 1.21 1.29
Female*Accessed Loans 0.13 -0.18 0.4 0.05 0.8 -0.07 1.94 1.25
[0.33] [0.36] [0.53] [0.43] [0.59] [0.40] [1.10]* [0.63]**
Implied Odds Ratio 1.14 0.83 1.49 1.05 2.22 0.93 6.96 3.47
Constant -0.98 -1.5 -1.7 -1.48 -3.25 -1.82 -3.54 -1.7
[0.16]*** [0.17]*** [0.22]*** [0.20]*** [0.27]*** [0.20]*** [0.34]*** [0.24]***
Observations 2876 2876 2876 2876 2876 2876 2876 2876
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Table 7: Indicators of Poverty: Consumption-Expenditure 
Impacts on the Core Poor 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
1 2 3 4 5
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sales of 
Livestock and 
Products
Profits from 
Livestock and 
Products
Agricultural 
Sales to Third 
Parties
Sales of 
Microenterprise
Profits from 
Microenterprise
Education of highest educated female -7820.45 -7414.47 -1,718.63*** 1997.11 1067.08
[5,302.04] [5,289.98] [541.854] [785.97]** [324.84]***
Literacy of female 17804.02 18759.24 -8,464.55*** 1423.64 1479.89
[26,552.60] [26,492.20] [2,711.897] [3,936.16] [1,626.78]
Numeracy of female -1151.04 -2724.84 9,426.19*** 1831.06 -1017.59
[21,520.79] [21,471.84] [2,198.717] [3,190.24] [1,318.50]
Education of highest educated male 630.15 763.97 27.82 60.8 447.11
[3,707.33] [3,698.89] [378.897] [549.57] [227.13]**
Literacy of male -34318.89 -32940.3 -565.97 3270.4 1962.23
[23,434.12] [23,380.82] [2,393.763] [3,473.87] [1,435.72]
Numeracy of male 48489.52 45538.61 7,175.63*** 7076.54 552.28
[23,007.49]** [22,955.15]** [2,350.659] [3,410.63]** [1,409.58]
Family generations in village 23339.06 23645.03 3,472.88** -6803.89 -890.95
[14,057.71]* [14,025.74]* [1,436.506] [2,083.92]*** [861.26]
Household member holding office 96629.05 93234.93 18,857.66*** 11217.11 2512.64
[39,007.39]** [38,918.67]** [3,985.058] [5,782.46]* [2,389.83]
Number of relatives in village 49.69 31.87 47.36* 28.28 -5.64
[249.10] [248.54] [25.443] [36.93] [15.26]
Children age 0-4 40125.32 38753.22 5,230.71*** 2814.12 1206.24
[14,318.31]*** [14,285.74]*** [1,463.298] [2,122.55] [877.23]
Children age 5-9 -5202.05 -5385.57 1,985.60 2613.47 371.29
[12,546.19] [12,517.66] [1,281.414] [1,859.85] [768.66]
Children age 10-15 5116.04 4673.69 952.87 6005.71 2388.62
[12,235.26] [12,207.43] [1,250.047] [1,813.76]*** [749.61]***
Female age 16-21 -10460.88 -11045.51 3,562.60 -4627.12 -1166.11
[21,270.30] [21,221.92] [2,172.890] [3,153.11] [1,303.15]
Female age 22-29 13662.89 12327 5,086.50** -4875.04 -2139.47
[24,830.43] [24,773.95] [2,536.842] [3,680.86] [1,521.27]
Female age 30-39 17907.75 16247.17 9,086.55*** -1098.24 344.65
[31,094.59] [31,023.87] [3,178.028] [4,609.46] [1,905.05]
Female age 40-49 30917.19 29965.52 11,724.87*** -3407.09 413.1
[36,167.81] [36,085.54] [3,698.480] [5,361.52] [2,215.86]
Female age 50-59 9298.48 7896.81 6,162.18 -1910.18 522.42
[41,137.31] [41,043.74] [4,203.543] [6,098.20] [2,520.33]
Female age over 60 17643.14 17180.27 -1,447.98 3799.23 1558.26
[26,753.07] [26,692.22] [2,734.222] [3,965.88] [1,639.06]
Male age 16-21 -25232.13 -25037.32 -4,555.72* -4165.92 242.32
[24,828.95] [24,772.47] [2,532.044] [3,680.64] [1,521.18]
Male age 22-29 -22470.6 -21987.59 -5,378.38** 3062.65 1711.47
[25,066.77] [25,009.75] [2,560.110] [3,715.90] [1,535.75]
Male age 30-39 -29715.36 -28708.53 3,046.77 -1847.06 -888.93
[29,284.14] [29,217.53] [2,991.894] [4,341.08] [1,794.13]
Male age 40-49 -67340.55 -66779.72 5,189.69 -1147.47 -970.56
[35,459.97]* [35,379.32]* [3,622.854] [5,256.59] [2,172.50]
Male age 50-59 -59805.48 -59831.78 6,854.13* 1052.09 -4134.46
[40,513.04] [40,420.89] [4,139.274] [6,005.65] [2,482.08]*
Male age over 60 -7375.98 -9338.77 674.57 -14766.77 -3821.23
[37,918.17] [37,831.92] [3,871.983] [5,620.99]*** [2,323.10]
Khushhali Bank Client (0/1) -12197.81 -12881.22 15,030.54*** 11833.86 2082.19
[51,251.39] [51,134.82] [5,235.873] [7,597.51] [3,139.98]
Core Poor 67671.51 71414.62 -6,993.16 -24425.08 -7952.08
[43,654.67] [43,555.38] [5,495.252] [6,471.37]*** [2,674.56]***
Accessed Loans 53644.93 52646.35 -7,862.67* 2522.01 1330.47
[53,984.77] [53,861.98] [4,602.934] [8,002.70] [3,307.44]
Core Poor*Accessed Loans -62730.55 -63696.63 14,274.32** 590.77 742.54
[65,601.65] [65,452.43] [6,905.903] [9,724.79] [4,019.16]
Constant -25,555.27 -20,187.89 -28,881.57*** 39,752.48 17,385.35
[53,748.54] [53,626.28] [5,482.648] [7,967.68]*** [3,292.97]***
Observations 1678 1678 1226 837 837
Table 8: Indicators of Poverty: Education and Health: Impacts on the Core Poor
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Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT
Education: 
Probability 
Children 
Enrolled in 
School
Education: 
Days Children 
Absent from 
School
Health: 
Probability 
seek 
medical 
treatment if 
child ill
Health: 
Probability 
medical 
treatment from 
trained 
professional if 
child ill
Probability 
take ORS to 
treat diarrhea
Probability 
children 
vaccinated
Education of highest educated female 0.05 0.27 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 0.02
[0.02]*** [0.17] [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.03]** [0.02]
Literacy of female 0.02 -0.32 -0.17 -0.05 -0.03 0.13
[0.10] [0.87] [0.10]* [0.10] [0.11] [0.12]
Numeracy of female 0.1 -1.72 0.15 0.02 0 -0.02
[0.08] [0.71]** [0.08]* [0.08] [0.09] [0.10]
Education of highest educated male 0.09 0.19 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.02
[0.01]*** [0.12] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]*
Literacy of male 0.25 3.41 0.08 0.08 0 0.3
[0.08]*** [0.77]*** [0.09] [0.09] [0.10] [0.10]***
Numeracy of male -0.12 -3.69 0.07 0.04 0.21 -0.22
[0.08] [0.76]*** [0.08] [0.08] [0.11]* [0.10]**
Family generations in village -0.06 0.51 0.05 0.1 -0.1 -0.04
[0.05] [0.46] [0.05] [0.05]* [0.06] [0.06]
Household member holding office 0.2 2.51 0.09 0.11 0.32 0.08
[0.14] [1.28]* [0.14] [0.14] [0.17]* [0.16]
Number of relatives in village 0 -0.02 0 0 0 0
[0.00]*** [0.01]** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00] [0.00]***
Children age 0-4 0.09 -0.17 1.22 1.18 0.54 1.94
[0.05]* [0.47] [0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.08]***
Children age 5-9 0.66 3.2 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.37
[0.05]*** [0.41]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.05]*** [0.05]***
Children age 10-15 0.78 1.39 -0.05 -0.07 -0.18 0
[0.05]*** [0.40]*** [0.04] [0.04]* [0.06]*** [0.05]
Female age 16-21 0.05 0.93 0.09 0.09 0.08 -0.19
[0.07] [0.70] [0.08] [0.08] [0.11] [0.09]**
Female age 22-29 -0.18 1.52 0.11 0.14 0.1 0
[0.09]** [0.82]* [0.09] [0.09] [0.12] [0.10]
Female age 30-39 -0.05 1.25 0.01 0.05 0.14 -0.26
[0.11] [1.02] [0.11] [0.11] [0.14] [0.12]**
Female age 40-49 0.11 2.77 -0.35 -0.31 -0.05 -0.32
[0.13] [1.19]** [0.13]*** [0.13]** [0.18] [0.14]**
Female age 50-59 -0.27 1.56 -0.18 -0.2 0.04 -0.03
[0.14]* [1.35] [0.15] [0.15] [0.20] [0.16]
Female age over 60 -0.07 0.78 -0.03 -0.1 0.19 0.07
[0.09] [0.88] [0.09] [0.09] [0.11]* [0.11]
Male age 16-21 -0.15 0.36 -0.21 -0.17 -0.26 -0.28
[0.09]* [0.82] [0.09]** [0.09]* [0.13]** [0.10]***
Male age 22-29 -0.34 0.3 -0.06 -0.02 -0.22 -0.06
[0.09]*** [0.82] [0.09] [0.09] [0.13]* [0.10]
Male age 30-39 0.03 1.8 -0.29 -0.22 -0.3 0.03
[0.11] [0.96]* [0.11]*** [0.11]** [0.15]** [0.11]
Male age 40-49 0.04 1.97 -0.26 -0.18 -0.32 -0.27
[0.13] [1.16]* [0.13]** [0.13] [0.18]* [0.14]*
Male age 50-59 0.12 1.05 -0.13 -0.05 -0.24 -0.16
[0.14] [1.33] [0.15] [0.15] [0.21] [0.16]
Male age over 60 -0.15 0.36 -0.25 -0.11 -0.18 -0.23
[0.13] [1.25] [0.14]* [0.14] [0.18] [0.15]
Khushhali Bank Client (0/1) 0.41 1.66 -0.24 -0.21 0.16 -0.02
[0.18]** [1.68] [0.18] [0.18] [0.24] [0.20]
Implied Odds Ratio 1.5 0.79 0.81 1.17 0.98
Core Poor -0.56 1.88 -0.07 -0.24 -0.09 -0.45
[0.15]*** [1.43] [0.16] [0.16] [0.20] [0.18]**
Implied Odds Ratio 0.57 0.94 0.78 0.91 0.64
Accessed Loans -0.33 -0.71 0.39 0.36 -0.09 -0.02
[0.19]* [1.77] [0.19]** [0.19]* [0.26] [0.21]
Implied Odds Ratio 0.72 1.47 1.44 0.92 0.98
Core Poor*Accessed Loans 0.55 -1.5 0.28 0.35 0.59 0.78
[0.23]** [2.15] [0.23] [0.23] [0.29]** [0.26]***
Implied Odds Ratio 1.74 1.32 1.42 1.81 2.18
Constant -1.76 -5.62 -1.84 -1.83 -3.06 -1.63
[0.20]*** [1.76]*** [0.20]*** [0.20]*** [0.27]*** [0.22]***
Observations 2876 2876 2876 2876 2876 2876
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Endnotes 
 
1 These goals are to (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger (2) achieve universal 
primary education (3) promote gender equality and empower women (4) reduce child 
mortality (5) improve maternal healthy (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases (7) ensure environmental stability and (8) develop a global partnership for 
development  (United National Development Programme, n.d.) 
 
2 This information on the microfinance sector in Pakistan comes from Haq (2008). In 
2009, there were problems in the sector with one MFI failing and the extent of 
outreach shrinking. 
 
3 See Haq (2008); this estimate is higher than the operational self-sufficiency ratios 
for other MFIs in Pakistan. 
 
4 The official poverty line is based on caloric intake and translates into approximately 
1,000 rupees per capita per month of food consumption.  Very rough calculations 
indicate that this level of caloric consumption corresponds to about 87 cents per day 
on total consumption.  The authors thank Talat Anwar for raising this issue and 
providing an updated poverty line estimate. 
 
5 This is a range of $50 -$500 at the exchange rate of approximately R60/US dollar 
prevailing in mid 2005. 
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6 In Pakistan, Zafar and Abid (1999) is an example of a qualitative approach to 
microfinance impact using focus groups and survey data from 55 households with no 
control group identified. 
 
7 Morduch (1999: 1605) pointed out that the eligibility criterion of low land holdings 
was not strictly enforced in practice. In a reworking of the results focusing on more 
directly comparable households, he found no impact on consumption from 
participation. The most recent critique of the original analysis and re-working of the 
data is Roodman and Morduch (2009).  
 
8 An F test that coefficient estimates on all village dummies are jointly insignificant is 
rejected at the 1% confidence level for many of the specifications, but re-running the 
regressions without village dummies yielded no qualitative difference in the results. 
The basic results in the model without the village dummies are not reported but are 
available from the authors.  
 
9 Coleman (1999) does not in fact does not suffer from this problem. 
 
10 706, or roughly half of the treatment group, were currently active clients: 13% were 
inactive, 18% were members of a group where at least one in the group was in 
default - thus making all members ineligible to receive loans - and 16% had dropped 
out of the program. 
 
11 To avoid excessive detail these results are not given but are available from the 
authors.  
 
 52 
                                                                                                                                            
12 Where is it weakly significant (in the case of child-rearing decisions) it has an 
unexpected negative sign. 
 
13 See Goetz and Gupta (1996) for an interpretation along these lines for the use of 
microcredit in Bangladesh. 
 
14 The results for these income generating activities are not reported here but further 
details of this aspect of the study are in Montgomery (2006). It should be noted that 
in the study design the bottom quintile had to be identified ex post rather than ex ante 
in relation to program participation. This means that there is the possibility of bias 
where the program itself influenced who was in the bottom quintile. Given the way in 
which the study was organized it is not possible to control for this so that the results 
from this part of the analysis should be interpreted with some caution. However the 
fact that overall there seems to have been no participation effect on total or income 
consumption weakens the risk of this bias.   
 
15 See the surveys of Meyer (2002), Montgomery and Weiss (2005), Goldberg (2007) 
and Karlan and Murdoch (2010). 
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